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Obtaining Statistics of Cascading Line Outages
Spreading in an Electric Transmission Network
from Standard Utility Data
Ian Dobson, Benjamin A. Carreras, David E. Newman, Jose´ M. Reynolds-Barredo
Abstract—We show how to use standard transmission line
outage historical data to obtain the network topology in such
a way that cascades of line outages can be easily located
on the network. Then we obtain statistics quantifying how
cascading outages typically spread on the network. Processing
real outage data is fundamental for understanding cascading
and for evaluating the validity of the many different models
and simulations that have been proposed for cascading in power
networks.
Index Terms—power system reliability, complex networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Complicated series of cascading outages in the transmission
network occasionally cause blackouts. These large cascading
blackouts are rare, but of substantial risk since their impact
is high [1], [2]. In cascading, initial outages propagate and
progressively spread across the network, and, if there are
many outages, load is shed and there is a blackout. The
initial outages can be random failures due to many different
causes, including weather, animals, equipment malfunction,
earthquakes, operational errors and malicious attacks. The
subsequent spreading of the outages beyond the initial outages
in a cascade of dependent outages is complicated and includes
many ways in which multiple previous outages or a common
cause such as weather can weaken the transmission network
to make further outages more likely.
To motivate our study, we first consider how the trans-
mission line outages spread in the August 10 1996 Western
interconnection blackout. The NERC blackout report [3] shows
the initial spread of the cascading as reproduced in Fig. 1.
The numbers show the order of the outages. It is clear that the
outages propagate to other outages both near and far in the
network and that the total extent of the cascade spreading can
be large. In particular, the first 18 line outages of the blackout
occur on the network formed in section II that is a subnetwork
of the Western interconnection, so we located the 18 outages
on this network. One way to measure the distance between two
line outages counts the minimum number of buses in a path
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Figure 1 
Fig. 1. Initial portion of Western interconnection blackout of August 10 1996.
Numbers show the order of the outages. Figure is extracted from [3].
in the network joining the two lines. For example, two lines
with a common bus are a distance one apart. In the case of the
first 18 line outages of the blackout, we find that the distance
between successive line outages ranges from 2 to 6 buses and
has a mean value of 3.2. The maximum extent of the first 18
cascading outages is 4 buses away from the initial outage.
This example of the August 10 1996 blackout shows the
initial spread of one blackout and shows what can possibly
happen. However, one cannot draw general conclusions about
how cascades typically spread from one sample. Indeed, the
August 10 1996 blackout is one of the more serious blackouts
that has ever occurred in the Western interconnection, whereas
the most common cascades, by careful design and operation
of the power system, are that an initial outage occurs and
either no outages or only a few outages follow. In order
to account for successful mitigation as well as failures of
mitigation, the assessment and mitigation of cascading risk
must account for cascades of all sizes.
The detail of the spreading of cascading outages can be
studied either by analyzing the complexities of particular
blackouts after they occur [4], [5], or by simulating some
subset of the mechanisms for cascading [6], [7], [8],
[9]. These approaches are very useful both in understanding
cascading blackouts and suggesting ways to mitigate particular
mechanisms of cascading failure. The spatial correlation of
Euclidean distance between outages is computed in [10]
for the July 2 and August 10 1996 Western interconnection
blackouts. However, cascading failure remains a hard problem
requiring multiple approaches. In this paper we pursue
another and complementary approach which is bulk statistical
analysis of typical observed cascading data. One advantage of
analyzing real data is that there are no modeling assumptions.
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2Bulk statistical analysis can describe the size and extent of
cascading from real or simulated cascades so that blackout risk
can be quantified. For example, cascading transmission line
outages from utility data [11], [12] can be used to estimate
the average propagation of transmission line outages during
the cascade as well as the probability distribution of cascading
size in terms of number of transmission line outages. Similar
efforts for simulated cascades in [13], [14] characterize the
distribution of blackout size in terms of load shed. These
studies quantify the average growth in blackout size during
the cascade and the probability of the cascade growing to
a given blackout size. Observed WECC data for the causes
and frequencies of common mode and dependent outages are
analyzed in [15].
There has also been general progress in describing how
cascades spread in simulated cascades, especially those as-
suming that cascades propagate by line outages causing static
overloads. Overloaded line cascading outage interactions are
analyzed using network resistance distance and line outage
distribution factors in [16]. Line outage distribution factor cal-
culations of the effect of double contingencies in overloading
other lines are used to find all the critical N-2 contingencies
in [17]. Progression of cascading through sets of lines is
described in the simulation of [18]. Interactions between cas-
cading line outages are described by line interactions graphs
different than the transmission network topology in [19], [20].
This paper processes observed transmission line outage data
to obtain the statistics of how cascades spread in a real power
network. This is, to our knowledge, the first statistical study
of typical cascade spreading and spatial extent based on real
data. The statistics of the manner and extent of real cascade
spreading is basic information that can support the analysis
and mitigation of cascading. For example, the chance of a
cascade spreading a certain amount can inform the design of
area monitoring and control to mitigate cascading, and the
fraction of cascading interactions at a given distance in the
network is of interest in distinguishing the mechanisms of
cascading that more frequently arise in practice.
Moreover, there is a large variety of many different sim-
ulation models of cascading that are claimed to represent
cascading in power networks [21], [22], and the extent to
which the statistics of cascade spreading match the observed
statistics serves either to validate the simulation or to suggest
ways to improve or disprove the simulation model [23]. It is
especially important to make this comparison since the real
data incorporates all the mechanisms of cascading whereas
the current simulations only represent a limited and varying
subset of the dozens of plausible cascading mechanisms [21],
[23]. More generally, the objective of the validation of the
models and simulations with real data is to determine which
mechanisms need to be represented and in what detail in order
to be able to do cascading failure risk analysis with confidence
in the results. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to
develop methods of data processing so that the statistics of
typical real cascades can be obtained and compared with the
statistics of simulated cascades.
Many countries, including the United States and Canada,
collect useful transmission line outage data, and it would seem
straightforward to sort this data into individual cascades and
determine where on the network the successive line outages are
located, and hence obtain the statistics of cascade spreading.
However, this is difficult unless a network model consistent
with the outage data is available. Indeed, an initial effort
using observed North American transmission line outage data
encountered substantial difficulties in automating the location
of the line outages in a network model that was not con-
sistent with the outage data [24]. For example, single buses
representing a single substation in the observed line outage
data can correspond to multiple buses of a detailed network
model, and the details of corresponding bus names can differ.
Single lines in the observed line outage data can correspond to
several sections of lines in the detailed network model. Devices
such as transformers in the detailed network model need to
be accounted for, and the areas and voltage levels covered
by the observed line outage data and the detailed network
model need to be coordinated. Overall, an automated analysis
is difficult since the observed line outage data corresponds to a
particular reduction of a detailed network model, and it is not
straightforward to perform that reduction in order to be able
to relate the network implicit in the observed data with the
detailed network model. These difficulties can be overcome
to some extent by a sustained combination of automatic and
hand processing; indeed [24] processes one year of line outage
data for higher voltage levels, but it remains challenging and
arduous to process enough data for statistically meaningful
results. These difficulties are not surprising; they are an
example of the general difficulty of coordinating different data
bases containing different power system network descriptions.
This paper describes a much better approach: we discovered
that it is practical to form a satisfactory network directly from
the line outage data as explained in section II.
The goal of this paper is to analyze observed cascading
data to quantify how cascades typically spread. We describe
a practical method to process standard utility data to locate
outages on a network and obtain some bulk statistics of
the spread, and illustrate the new method with real data
that is publicly available. Similar data is produced by North
American utilities for reporting to NERC, and also by some
utilities worldwide, so that the method can be applied broadly
to existing utility data.
II. FORMING THE NETWORK FROM UTILITY DATA
The required data is a list of recorded transmission line
outages1, including the outage start time (to the nearest minute
suffices) and the names of the buses at both ends of the
line, and, for multiple circuits between the same two buses,
the circuit number. The automatic line outages should be
identified, since the cascade analysis should primarily address
the automatic outages. For some purposes it is also useful to
know the line length, nominal voltage rating and district. All
this data is standard. For example, this data is reported by
North American utilities in NERC’s Transmission Availability
1 The analysis could be extended to incorporate other outages such as
generators and transformers, but since we do not have enough of this data,
and the transmission lines capture the spreading, automatic transmission line
outages suffice for a first analysis.
3Data System (TADS) [25], [26] and is also collected in several
other countries.
The transmission line outage data used in this paper starts
from 44 593 automatic and planned line outages2 recorded by
a North American utility over a period of 14 years starting in
January 1999 [27]. The data requires some cleaning adjust-
ments before the main processing. Outages in districts remote
from the main network, outages of 9 lines rated below 68 kV,
outages of 7 lines that did not have bus names for each end
of the line and 10 rural lines that seemed disconnected from
the main network were all deleted. About 20 bus names were
adjusted to eliminate duplicate forms of the same bus name
or to combine buses in the same or adjacent substation. This
left 42 561 automatic and planned line outages from the main
connected network of the utility, with each line outage having
a sending end and receiving end bus identified from a list of
unique bus names.3
Then the network model was constructed simply by joining
two buses with a transmission line if there was in the data
an automatic or planned outage of the line joining those
buses. This procedure produces a subset of the actual network,
capturing only those branches that have experienced an outage
within the time horizon of the data. Since it is not obvious how
much outage data is needed to form a sufficiently complete
network model in this way, we address and confirm the
completeness of the network model formed in this way in
section VII.
The network model obtained from the data is shown in
Fig. 2. It is a connected network with 361 buses and 614
lines. An important practical advantage of forming the network
Fig. 2. Network formed from line outage data. Layout is not geographic.
model directly from the outage data is that there is then no
difficulty establishing the correspondence between the network
model and the outage data; the correspondence is immediate
by construction. For example, an observed cascade obtained
from the data set is located on the network as shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 changes or omits identifying details since it is bad
practice to publish these when it is not absolutely necessary.
2 Lines that are normally out are ignored.
3We do not process outages of sections of lines or taps of lines or feeders
in forming the network and analyzing the outages.
JOSQUIN
ISAAC
DUFAY
OCKEGHEM
ANON
BYRD
TALLIS
TYE
DOWLAND
GIBBONS
outage start time
transmission line hour:minute generation
JOSQUIN− ISAAC 15:22 1
GIBBONS−DOWLAND 15:25 2
ISAAC−OCKEGHEM 15:27 3
DOWLAND−BYRD 15:37 4
ANON−BYRD 15:37 4
OCKEGHEM−DUFAY No 1 15:49 5
TYE−TALLIS 15:57 6
Fig. 3. Illustrative example of a cascade of line outages located on the
network. The darker and red network lines are the lines that outage. The
numbers are the generation number of the outage and show the order in
which the outages occur. Outages occurring in sufficiently quick succession
are in the same generation. The bus names and outage times are changed for
the illustrative presentation in this figure. Layout is not geographic.
III. GROUPING OUTAGES INTO CASCADES AND
GENERATIONS
Having formed the network model from both the automatic
and planned line outages, the analysis of the cascade spreading
proceeds with only the automatic outages. There are 10 942
automatic outages in the data. One motivation for analyzing
only the automatic outages is that cascading focusses on
uncontrolled outages; for example, NERC defines cascading as
“the uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered
by an incident at any location [28].”
The structure of cascading is that each cascade starts with
4initial outages in the first generation followed by further
outages grouped into generations 2, 3, 4, ... until the cascade
stops. The first step in processing the line outages is to group
the line outages into individual cascades, and then within each
cascade to group the outages that occur in close succession into
generations. The grouping of the outages into cascades and
generations within each cascade is done based on the outage
start times according to the method of [12]. We summarize the
procedure here and refer to [12] for the details. The grouping
is done by looking at the gaps in start time between successive
outages. If successive outages have a gap of one hour or
more, then the outage after the gap starts a new cascade
(note that operator actions are usually completed within one
hour). Within each cascade, if successive outages have a gap
of more than one minute, then the outage after the gap starts
a new generation of the cascade (note that fast transients and
protection actions such as auto-reclosing are completed within
one minute). Note that since the outage times are only known
to the nearest minute, the order of outages within a generation
often cannot be determined.
This procedure applied to the 10 942 automatic outages
yields 6687 cascades. 84% of these cascades have only one
generation of outages and do not spread further.
IV. NETWORK DISTANCES
To quantify the spatial spreading of the cascading line
outages, we specify two measures of distance in the network
between two lines.
The network distance between lines Li and Lj in terms of
number of buses45 is defined as
dbus(Li, Lj) = minimum number of buses in a network path
joining midpoint of Li to midpoint of Lj .
For example, the distance dbus of line to itself is zero and the
distance dbus of a line to a neighboring line with at least one
bus in common is one.
The network distance between lines Li and Lj in terms of
miles of transmission line6 is defined as
dmile(Li, Lj) = minimum length in miles of a network path
joining midpoint of Li to midpoint of Lj .
Cascading lines occur in generations and we define the
network distance between two generations of lines. (Note
that from the point of view of the processing that groups
4It is common to define the network distance between buses as the minimum
number of lines in a path between the buses, and dbus(Li, Lj) can be
conveniently evaluated using this network distance between buses: Except
for the case of the distance of a line to itself, dbus(Li, Lj) is one plus the
minimum bus distance between either of the end buses in Li and either of
the end buses in Lj . This follows since a path between the midpoints of Li
and Lj with the minimum number of buses must include a path between the
end buses of Li and the end buses of Lj with the minimum number of buses.
5The distance dbus(Li, Lj) is the same as the network distance between
Li and Lj in the line graph of the network.
6dmiles(Li, Lj) can also be conveniently evaluated using a network
distance between buses: Except for the case of the distance of a line to itself,
dmiles(Li, Lj) is half the length of Li plus half the length of Lj plus the
minimum bus distance in miles between either of the end buses of Li and
either of the end buses of Lj .
outages into generations, lines outaging in the same gener-
ation outage simultaneously and their outage times cannot be
distinguished.) We write d for the network distance which can
either be in terms of number of buses or in terms of miles.
Then the mean network distance between generation of lines
Gi and generation of lines Gj is defined as
dmean(Gi, Gj) = mean{d(Li, Lj), Li in Gi and Lj in Gj}
and the maximum network distance between generation Gi
and generation Gj is defined as
dmax(Gi, Gj) = max{d(Li, Lj), Li in Gi and Lj in Gj}.
V. STATISTICS OF CASCADE SPREADING
Fig. 4. Probability distribution of network distance dbusmean(Gi, Gi+1)
between successive generations of line outages. The error bars show a 95%
confidence interval.
TABLE I
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NETWORK DISTANCES
dbusmean d
bus
maxspread
Between successive generations Max from initial
probability given
distance probability distance> 0 probability
0 0.227±0.017 0.777±0.010
1 0.166±0.015 0.214±0.019 0.088±0.007
2 0.123±0.013 0.159±0.017 0.023±0.004
3 0.115±0.013 0.148±0.016 0.023±0.004
4 0.099±0.012 0.127±0.015 0.018±0.003
5 0.073±0.010 0.095±0.013 0.016±0.003
6 0.080±0.011 0.103±0.014 0.020±0.003
7 0.055±0.009 0.071±0.012 0.015±0.003
8 0.035±0.007 0.045±0.009 0.011±0.003
9 0.013±0.004 0.017±0.006 0.004±0.002
10 0.013±0.004 0.017±0.006 0.003±0.001
± errors are 95% confidence intervals
There are 6687 cascades and 84% of these cascades have
only one generation and so do not spread further. To analyze
the spreading cascades, we exclude the cascades with only one
generation, and only analyze the remaining 1098 cascades with
more than one generation.
We are interested in the distance between successive genera-
tions of line outages dmean(Gi, Gi+1) where Gi and Gi+1 are
successive generations in the same cascade. There are 2426
such pairs of successive generations in the data. (There are
5Fig. 5. Cumulative probability distribution of the network distance
dmilemean(Gi, Gi+1) between successive generations of line outages.
no successive generations in the 5589 cascades with only one
generation.)
The statistics of the network distance for these successive
generations in terms of number of buses is shown in Fig. 4
and Table I. The mean number of buses between successive
generations is 2.9 and the median number of buses between
successive generations is 2. The most frequent number of buses
(23%) is zero; these are cases in which an outaged line is
restored but outages again after more than one minute and
less than one hour after the initial outage. Next most frequent
(17%) is one bus, in which a neighboring line outages. But
more than one bus, or equivalently not a repeat outage and not
a neighbor, has frequency 60%. So, while neighboring lines
do outage, this is less likely than the same line tripping again
and much less likely than a non-neighboring line outaging.
The distribution of the distance in network miles of succes-
sive generations of the spreading cascades is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 shows that half of the successive generations spread
more than 100 miles, one third of the successive generations
spread more than 200 miles, and one eighth of the successive
generations spread more than 400 miles.
In the processing described so far, we have counted a
repeated outage of the same line after more than one minute
delay as one additional outage, and the distance spread in this
case is zero. While this is reasonable since repeated outages
have more impact than a single unrepeated outage, one could
alternatively regard the repeat outages as the same as the orig-
inal outage and count them only once. Then all the successive
outages in a cascade move in the network a distance that is
greater than zero. The effect of this alternative assumption
on the spreading statistics is obtained by conditioning the
probabilities on the spreading distance being greater than zero
and the results for the bus network distance are also shown in
Table I.
We are also interested in the maximum distance that a
cascade spreads from the initial generation of outages G0:
dmaxspread(Ck) = max{dmax(G0, Gi),
G0 the initial generation in cascade Ck and
Gi any generation in cascade Ck}
This maximum spreading distance is shown in Fig. 6 and
Table I for number of buses and Fig. 7 for network miles.
Most of the probability of zero spreading is due to cascades
with only one line outage. If the cascades with only one line
outage are excluded, the mean maximum distance spread is
3.8 buses.
Fig. 6. Probability distribution of the network distance dbusmaxspread which
is the maximum network bus distance between the initial generation of line
outages and any generation of line outages in the same cascade. The error
bars show a 95% confidence interval. Only dbusmaxspread > 0 is plotted. The
probability of a cascade not spreading (dbusmaxspread = 0) is 0.78 with 95%
confidence interval ±0.005.
Fig. 7. Probability distribution of the network distance dmilemaxspread which is
the maximum distance in miles between the initial generation of line outages
and any generation of line outages in the same cascade.
All the spreading statistics show the effects of the finite size
and edges of the network. In terms of network bus distance,
the diameter of a network is the maximum possible distance
dbus(Li, Lj) between any two lines Li and Lj . The diameter
of the network is 15, so this is an upper bound to the spreading
results shown in Figs. 4, 6, and Table I. There are two types
of cascades: cascades that are confined to the network lines
for which the data includes all the outages, and cascades that
involve lines outside the network that have missing data. The
cascades that involve lines outside the network have spreads
6that can exceed the spread confined to the network and affect
the results in Fig. 6 by tending to increase moderate spreads,
tending to reduce larger observed spreads such as spreads of
more than 10 buses, and eliminating cascades of more than
15 buses. This “network edge effect” is of interest for future
work in trying to quantify how many cascades spread to or
from a neighboring power system area.
VI. INDEPENDENT OUTAGES AND DEPENDENT OUTAGES
Cascading arises from a variety of types of dependent
outages, and it is useful to check that independently occurring
outages do not contribute much to the results. Independent
outages occur randomly throughout the year. Most of these
independent line outages are isolated in time from each other
and from dependent outages, and do not contribute to the
measures of cascading effects used in this paper. By chance,
occasionally these independent line outages occur in close
proximity to each other or to dependent outages in time and do
contribute to the measures of cascading. This section quantifies
the contribution of statistically independent outages towards
the measures of cascading used in this paper.
Each cascade contains at least one initiating outage, and
we assume that the first initiating outage7 in each cascade is
independent, and that a fraction R of the remaining outages in
all the cascades are also independent outages. Then, since there
are 6687 initiating outages and 4255 remaining outages, there
are 6687+4255R independent outages in the 10 942 observed
outages, and this corresponds to an independent outage rate of
0.055 + 0.035R per hour. We model the independent outages
as a Poisson process [30] with this rate. In particular, the time
differences between independent outages are exponentially
distributed with rate parameter 0.055 + 0.035R.
It is convenient to call the outages that remain after the
first initiating outage of each cascade is omitted “remaining
outages.” A remaining independent outage is processed as
belonging to a cascade when it occurs after the initiating
outage but no later than one hour after the last outage of a
cascade. The average time between the initiating outage and
last outage of a cascade is 7 minutes or 0.12 hour. Therefore,
on average, a remaining independent outage is processed as
belonging to a cascade when it occurs less than 1.12 hour
after the initiating outage of a cascade. Therefore, assuming
that the preceding independent outage is the initiating outage8,
the fraction R of remaining independent outages that are
processed as belonging to a cascade is
R = P [time difference with preceding outage < 1.12 hour]
= 1− exp[−(0.055 + 0.035R)1.12] (1)
Solving (1) numerically gives R = 0.06. That is, approxi-
mately 6% of the remaining outages, or 4% of all outages, are
independent but classified as cascading outages.
7If there are several initiating outages at the same time, then we arbitrarily
choose one of these to be the first one.
8 In the much rarer case that the preceding independent outage during
the cascade is not the initiating outage, the approximation (1) is not much
different since in this case the remaining independent outage is processed as
belonging to a cascade when it occurs on average less than a time T after
the preceding outage, where 1.0 < T < 1.12.
One way to appreciate the strong effect of cascading de-
pendence in the cascade spreading results is to remove the
dependence by retaining the observed outages, but assigning
them artificial and random outage times sampled from a
Poisson process. Then, with the same processing described
in section III, the number of cascades increases from 6687 to
9956 because there are more cascades with only one outage,
but these initial outages propagate very weakly as shown in
Table II; the average propagation of outages9 reduces from
0.28 to 0.08.
TABLE II
NUMBER OF LINE OUTAGES IN GENERATIONS 0 TO 10
generation number
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
outages with cascading dependence; average propagation = 0.28
7911 1347 497 272 170 114 90 63 54 40 40
outages with artificial, random times; average propagation = 0.08
9975 841 69 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
While it is useful for some purposes, such as classifying
outages and their mechanisms, to find out how much inde-
pendent outages contribute to the cascading results by being
lumped together with dependent outages, it should also be
emphasized that the power system operators have to deal with
multiple outages closely spaced in time regardless of their
independence or dependence.
One consequence of our analysis method of grouping the
outages into generations is that it classifies automatic outages
as initial outages (in the first generation), or as dependent
outages (in second or higher generations). Of the 10 942
automatic outages there are 7911 initial outages (comprising
72%) and 3031 dependent outages (comprising 28%).
Since many of the mechanisms for initial outages differ from
the mechanisms for dependent outages, it can be expected
that there can be some differences between the initial and
dependent outages, as observed in simulated cascades [29]. We
examine the most frequently involved lines in initial outages
and in dependent outages. One half of the 20 lines most
frequently involved in initial outages differ from the 20 lines
most frequently involved in dependent outages. And one third
of the 100 lines most frequently involved in initial outages
differ from the 100 lines most frequently involved in dependent
outages.
It is also very useful to analyze the causes of the initial
outages from utility data since some of these causes can
be mitigated, and mitigating the initial outages is one way
to reduce cascading outages [25], [26]. This paper does not
address this useful aspect of cascade analysis and mitigation
because this paper has the complementary objective of opening
up possibilities for analysis and mitigation of the dependent
cascading outages that follow the initial outages.
VII. COMPLETENESS OF THE NETWORK
As more outages are processed, outages of new lines are
encountered, and the network formed from all the outages
9Details of the average propagation definition are in [11].
7Fig. 8. Cumulative number of lines in network as the number of outages
processed increases.
Fig. 9. Cumulative number of lines in network as the number of reordered
outages processed increases.
processed so far becomes more complete, and, if sufficiently
many outages from a fixed network are processed, the network
formed from all the outages processed so far converges to
the entire network. This section examines this convergence to
show that enough outages were processed to form a good ap-
proximation of the network. This verifies building the network
from the outage data.
In practice, the network slowly changes as new lines are
added and old lines retire. Therefore the network formed from
the outages includes both retired and new lines over the time
period of the processed outages.
Both convergence towards a complete network and the effect
of the network changing can be seen in Fig. 8. Fig. 8 initially
shows the number of lines in the network converging as more
outages are processed and then finally increasing slowly as
new lines are added in the later outages. To confirm the
convergence, we want to remove the effect of the network
changing from Fig. 8. This is done by splitting the outage
data into two halves at the midpoint, reversing the order of
the data in the second half, and then interleaving the reversed
second half with the first half. To give a small example, if
10 outages were originally in the order 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
then the reordering yields 1,10,2,9,3,8,4,7,5,6. The problem
of confirming convergence arises from new lines added in
the later, converging portion of the data (new lines added in
the earlier portion of the data only affect the transient before
the convergence), and the reversal of the second half of data
ensures that these new lines are likely to appear in the data
before convergence. (Note that simply reversing all the data
does not work: the new lines added during the converging
portion of the data would now appear before convergence,
solving the problem of the new lines, but now there would be
a new problem of lines retiring at the beginning of the data
appearing as added lines at the end of the reversed data.)
The reordered outages that remove the effect of the changing
network from the convergence are shown in Fig. 9 and the
convergence is clear. The network constructed from the data
would ideally include all the lines that have been present for
a portion of or all of the time period, and the convergence
analysis shows that the network constructed with the data
converges to almost all such network lines.
VIII. SENSITIVITY TO CASCADE INTERVAL
We check the sensitivity of the results to the one-hour
minimum interval between cascades assumed in processing the
data in section III. Changing the minimum interval between
cascades from one hour to 30 minutes causes the number
of cascades to increase from 6687 to 7332 and changes the
results in Table I to the results shown in Table III. The results
are close; probabilities change by less than 0.01, with the
exception of the lowest distance results in each column, which
change by less than 0.04.
TABLE III
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF NETWORK DISTANCES
WITH CASCADE INTERVAL 30 MINUTES
dbusmean d
bus
maxspread
Between successive generations Max from initial
probability given
distance probability distance> 0 probability
0 0.259±0.020 0.805±0.009
1 0.179±0.018 0.242±0.023 0.090±0.007
2 0.125±0.015 0.168±0.020 0.022±0.003
3 0.107±0.014 0.144±0.019 0.020±0.003
4 0.090±0.013 0.122±0.018 0.015±0.003
5 0.066±0.012 0.089±0.015 0.012±0.002
6 0.071±0.012 0.096±0.016 0.014±0.003
7 0.047±0.010 0.064±0.013 0.009±0.002
8 0.030±0.008 0.041±0.011 0.007±0.002
9 0.012±0.005 0.016±0.007 0.003±0.001
10 0.011±0.005 0.015±0.007 0.002±0.001
± errors are 95% confidence intervals
IX. COMPARING CASCADE SPREAD STATISTICS FROM THE
OPA SIMULATION WITH THE OBSERVED DATA
We make an initial comparison between the statistics of
cascade spreading simulated by the OPA simulation and the
statistics of the observed cascade spreading data from the
previous sections. The intent is to show a specific example
of using the paper results for improvement and validation of
models, and to show how some technical issues in such a
comparison may be addressed.
We start by briefly summarizing the OPA simulation, which
includes a fast time scale for cascading transmission line
outages and a slow time scale for the complex systems
feedback shaping the reliability; for details see [9].
8The fast time scale of the cascading line outages and
blackouts is of the order of minutes to hours. The cascading
blackouts are modeled by overloads and outages of lines
determined in the context of a standard DC load flow model
of the network power flows and generator power dispatch
optimized by standard linear programming. The successive
calculations in the simulation naturally produce generations of
line outages in each cascade. If lines outage in a generation,
the model recomputes and check the load flow for overloaded
lines. The overloaded lines outage probabilistically, and if any
of these overloaded lines outage they form the next generation
of line outages. If none of the overloaded lines in a generation
outage, the cascade stops.
The slow time scale of the OPA simulation in which the
power system evolves is of the order of days to years. In
the slow timescale, the load power demand slowly increases
and transmission lines involved in blackouts are upgraded as
engineering responses to blackouts and maximum generator
power is increased in response to the increasing demand.
These slow opposing forces of load increase and network
upgrade self organize the system to a complex system dynamic
equilibrium that is close to the critical points of the system [9],
[1], [33]. The results used here were obtained from OPA in
this complex system dynamic equilibrium condition.
OPA was validated on a model of WECC with respect
to historically observed statistics in [31], using a 1553-bus
network model of WECC developed in a California Energy
Commission project for analysis of extreme blackout events
[32]. The OPA parameters used were derived from WECC
data. The simulated and observed statistics compared were
the distribution of blackout sizes, the number of line outages,
the number of generations, and the average propagation of
number of line outages between generations. The simulated
and observed statistics agreed well, except for the average
propagation of number of line outages in the later cascade
stages. For the present paper, we extend the comparison to the
statistics of cascade spatial spreading using the same 1553-bus
network and OPA parameters as in [31].
16 788 cascades and 28 361 line outages across the entire
WECC were simulated with OPA. Many of these cascades
occur wholly or partially outside of the Northwest region10
of WECC that covers the collection area for the observed
data analyzed in the paper. To approximate the conditions of
the observed data, we limited the analysis to the 6534 line
outages that occurred inside the Northwest region. That is, the
analyzed simulated outages correspond to the cascades or parts
of cascades that occurred inside the Northwest region. This
yielded 6534 outages which are organized into 2768 cascades
and 5082 generations using the method of section III. These
were then processed to obtain the distances of section IV
between generations of line outages using the network distance
on the 1553-bus network.
Fig. 10 shows the probability distribution of distance in
the 1553 network between successive generations of sim-
ulated outages as open circles. The mean distance in the
10 The Northwest region can be determined as WECC bus numbers in the
range 40 000 to 49 999.
Fig. 10. Probability distributions of network distance dbusmean(Gi, Gi+1)
between successive generations of observed line outages on the formed
network (dots) and simulated outages on the 1553-bus network (circles).
Fig. 11. Probability density functions of network distance dbusmean(Gi, Gi+1)
between successive generations of observed line outages (dots) and simulated
line outages (circles) with the 1553-bus network distances scaled to formed
network distances.
1553 network between the simulated successive generations of
outages is 9.8. Since OPA (in common with other cascading
failure simulations) does not simulate repeated outages of the
same line, the simulated results should be compared with the
probability distribution of nonzero distances in the formed net-
work between the observed successive generations of outages.
This is the data of the second column of Table I and it is
plotted as the solid dots in Fig. 10. The mean distance in the
formed network between the observed successive generations
of outages is 3.8.
A problem with the comparison in Fig. 10 is that the
network distances are measured in different network represen-
tations of a similar area of the power system. To correct this,
we computed the mean network distance between 10 000 pairs
of randomly chosen buses in each network, yielding a mean
bus distance of 14.0 in the 1553 bus network and a mean bus
distance of 6.4 in the network formed from the data. The ratio
of the bus distances, 6.4/14.0 = 0.46, is applied as a scaling
factor to the simulated distances to allow the comparison with
the same distance scale in Fig. 11 (to allow direct comparison
of the probabilities despite the distance scale change, Fig. 11
shows a probability density on the vertical scale). The mean
distances expressed in terms of the distance for the formed
network are now 4.5 for the simulation and, as before, 3.8 for
the observed data.
Fig. 11 shows agreement between the statistics of spreading
between the simulated and observed data for long-range cas-
9cading interactions and disagreement for shorter-range interac-
tions. In particular, the simulated data shows fewer interactions
at distances 1 or 2 and more interactions at distances 4 or
5 than the observed data. Beyond showing which aspects of
reality are well described by the simulation and for which
purposes the predictions of the simulation are validated, a
particular value of this comparison of spreading statistics is
that it suggests the aspects of the simulation to be reconsidered
to improve the match. In this case, the results indicate that the
modeling of short range cascading interactions is not captured
well enough by OPA. Obvious candidates for improvement
in the short-range modeling would include protection system
effects (such as hidden failures [6]) and representing parallel
transmission lines in the network.
X. CONCLUSIONS
It is fundamental to the study of cascading blackouts in
transmission networks to be able to process and characterize
real cascading outage data. This paper gives new methods to
process the spread of transmission line outages from standard
utility data already collected by utilities and gives the first
statistical characterization of how the cascading outages typi-
cally spread on the network. We also discuss the opportunities
in cascading risk analysis opened up by these new methods,
including the validation of simulations and models for cas-
cading risk analysis that is needed to advance the field. The
quantification of typical cascade spatial spreading in this paper
complements and augments the quantification of cascading
propagation in terms of number of line outages in [12].
A. Contributions to methods of outage data analysis
The paper contributes new methods of analyzing standard
outage data:
• We solved the problem of obtaining a network model
at the same level of detail as and compatible with the
outage data by using the outage data itself to form the
network. This is shown to be an effective and practical
solution to an otherwise messy problem coordinating
different network descriptions. Then the recorded outages
can be readily located on the network so that their spread
can be observed in terms of network distance between
generations of outages.
• We demonstrated methods to verify that a substantially
complete network is formed from the line outage data.
Even when the network changes over the period of
observation, reordering the data can verify the network
completion.
• Cascading is initial outages followed by dependent out-
ages. The processing methods include a small fraction
of independent outages among the dependent outages,
and we show how to estimate the fraction of independent
outages.
• We define metrics describing the average distances be-
tween generations of line outages on the network in terms
of both average number of buses between the generations
and network miles.
B. Contributions of the results of the data analysis
We present for the first time some basic statistics of real
cascades spreading on a power transmission network. The
spreading is quantified in terms of the minimum number of
buses or network miles between generations of cascading line
outages. In the case of the average minimum number of buses
between generations, a generation of outages is followed by
a repeated outage of the same line in about one quarter of
the cases, and only one sixth are followed by a neighboring
line outage. (Even if we ignore the repeated outages, less than
one quarter are followed by a neighboring line outage.) A
generation of cascading outages is followed by an outage of
a non-neighboring line in over half of the cases. As detailed
below, these statistics of typical cascade spreading can be used
to help validate cascading models and simulations, understand
the mechanisms of dependent cascading outages, design cas-
cade mitigation schemes, and develop new cascading models.
The data shows that the lines most involved in initial
outages and the subsequent propagation of dependent outages
differ somewhat, as might be expected from the different
mechanisms involved. Also, there are dramatic differences in
the amount of propagation between realistic outages that have
cascading dependencies and outages that occur at artificially
randomized times.
We show that, after the initial automatic outage, the fol-
lowing cascades of mostly dependent outages contain about
6% independent outages. The distinction between independent
and dependent outages is important in understanding and
mitigating cascading, but it is also worth noting that in any
case the power system operators have to cope with multiple
outages regardless of their cause.
While the data used in the paper is from one large trans-
mission operator, the methods can be applied much more
broadly because the data is already routinely collected by
some transmission operators internationally. In the USA, since
TADS data is reported by all transmission operators, the
approach can be applied by any transmission operator or by
reliability organizations that aggregate the TADS data.
C. Using spatial spreading data to validate models and sim-
ulations for cascading risk analysis
A large variety of cascading outage models and simulations
have been proposed. For example, a 2008 survey paper refer-
ences a sample of about 25 different models and simulations
and many more have been subsequently proposed. However,
there has been very little quantitative validation of these
models with real data in the sense of reproducing observed
cascade statistics so that they can be relied upon to quantify
cascading risk.11 There is a strong need for this validation so
that the most important mechanisms of cascading risk analysis
can be determined and represented at an appropriate level of
detail. The statistics of cascading spread in this paper are a
11 In many cases, simulated cascades are judged to be credible, or a
limited selection of the dozens of mechanisms involved in cascading failure
are reasonably approximated. Exceptions where some aspects have been
quantitatively validated with observed data include [5], [12], [31]. For a
detailed account of validation approaches and current needs see [23].
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new contribution to the observed cascade statistics. This will
enable the validation and improvement of cascading models
and simulations that are close to the reality of power systems
and the rejection of models that are unrealistic.
Two examples of this validation process are:
• Section IX shows an example of this validation process by
comparing the statistics of the next generation spreading
of line outages in the OPA simulation of cascading with
the observed statistics, after an appropriate normalization
of the distances in the simulated network. We show
how the comparison of spatial spreads distinguishes the
matches obtained for long-range and short-range cascad-
ing mechanisms, giving insight into which mechanisms
need to be differently modeled to get a better match.
• Our data clearly shows a substantial fraction of non-
local propagation of outages. Therefore cascading models
from complex network theory that hypothesize nearest-
neighbor propagation on the topology of the electrical
network are inconsistent with the data observed in this
paper.
D. Opening up other possibilities in cascading risk analysis
Other possible research directions based on the cascading
spread data include:
• When analyzing outage data to better understand cascad-
ing, dependent outages can now be classified according
to local or more global mechanisms according to how far
they are from preceding outages in the cascade. The larger
risk analysis context is that one can start from available
outage data and then use the interaction distances and
other attributes to classify the observations of dependent
outages into groups of mechanisms.12
• The observed statistical data on cascading spread could
enable approximate high-level stochastic models of the
effect of cascading. For example, given some initial
damaged components outaging in an earthquake [34],
[35], one could sample from a branching process model
calibrated with the outage statistics [12] to determine
the number of line outages in the next generation and
then use the statistics generated in this paper to sample
the position on the network of the line outages. This
would give a Monte Carlo way to approximate the
extent to which the blackout cascaded beyond the initial
damage caused by the quake. While such a method is
a rough approximation, it is grounded in the reality of
the observed data, and may be a useful approximation
in some contexts. For example, optimized transmission
planning investments accounting for the risk of earth-
quakes is already highly computationally intensive [34],
[35], and a fast, approximate assessment sampling the
effect of cascading would be useful13. The problem of
12This general “top-down” and data-driven approach is complementary
to detailed modeling of a particular dependent outage mechanism and then
seeking data for the detailed model.
13 Even when it is desirable in principle to model cascading more exactly,
there are some computations and contexts in which the computational,
modeling and data limitations require a simple stochastic approximation, and
it is better to use an approximate model than to omit the effect of cascading
entirely.
estimating the further spread of cascading blackout is
particularly important for earthquakes (and other natural
disasters or attacks [36]) because earthquakes typically
cause much more death, destruction and economic losses
than blackouts, but if the response to the earthquake is
delayed by a widespread cascading blackout, the losses
from the earthquake will be significantly increased.
• The statistics of how far cascades typically spread are a
starting point for designing local and wide area schemes
for mitigating cascading. In particular, for design one
needs to know typical interaction distances for dependent
outages (available from probability distributions such as
Fig. 4) and the fraction of cascades that are confined to
the design area of the scheme (available from probability
distributions such as Fig. 6).
That is, in addition to validating cascading models and simula-
tions, there are several promising avenues of engineering risk
analysis that open up given that real cascades can be readily
tracked spatially on a network.
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